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In order to shed light on the recent debates that are reinterpreting the role played by
organized employers in the development of modern social policy, this paper
examines the origin of the system of contributory unemployment insurance during
the Weimar period. Contrary to the claims of the ‘laborist’ accounts of the origin of
the modern welfare state that view the working class as the most important
protagonist behind the transition from 'assistance' to 'insurance' policies, this paper
argues that employers’ dissatisfaction with the means-tested system of
unemployment assistance and employers’ endorsement of an insurance solution to
the risk of unemployment was the decisive factor leading to the introduction of the
insurance system during the Weimar period.
Drawing on original archival material, this paper reconstructs the political
preferences of employers towards various institutional solutions to the risk of
unemployment and focuses on a sectoral conflict between employers of large and
small firms over the organization of the ‘risk pool’ within the system of unemployment
insurance. While the existing literature concerned with the political role played by
employers in the development of the modern welfare state fails to provide the
analytical elements for an understanding of employers’ preference towards social
policies, this paper attempts to address this limitation of the existing literature by
providing the microfoundations for an understanding of sectoral differences in the
degree of employers support for  alternative social policies.
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Diskussionspapier wird die politische Entwicklung während der Weimarer
Periode von dem System der Arbeitslosenfürsorge zur Arbeitslosen-versicherung
analysiert, um die Diskussion zur Rolle der organisierten Arbeit-geber bei der
Entwicklung der modernen Sozialpolitik neuerlich zu beleuchten. Das Ergebnis der
Analyse widerspricht der „power-resource“- Theorie. Im Gegensatz zu den
„laborists“, die die Arbeiterklasse als wichtigsten Protago-nisten für das Entstehen
des modernen Wohlfahrtsstaates sehen, wird hier die Meinung vertreten, daß die
Unzufriedenheit der Arbeitgeber mit einem System der Arbeitslosenfürsorge und ihre
Bevorzugung eines Systems der Arbeits-losenversicherung der letztlich
entscheidende politische Faktor war, der die Einführung einer
Arbeitslosenversicherung ermöglichte.
Auf der Basis der historischen Quellen wird in diesem Beitrag die politische
Haltung der Arbeitgeber für unterschiedliche institutionelle Lösungen des Risikos
„Arbeitslosigkeit“ analysiert. Dabei geht es besonders um den  Konflikt zwischen
Groß- und Kleinunternehmen über die Gestaltung des „Risiko-Pools“ innerhalb der
Arbeitslosenversicherung. In den vorliegenden Publikationen zur politischen Rolle
der Unternehmer bei der Entwicklung des Wohlfahrtsstaates werden keineArgumente für eine Analyse vorgelegt, die zu einem Verstehen der Präferenz der
Arbeitgeber für sozialpolitische Regelungen beitragen. In dem vorliegenden Papier
wird versucht, diese Selbstbeschränkung in der vorhandenen Literatur in den Blick
zu nehmen und die Ansätze einer Theorie der politischen Präferenzen der
Unternehmen für verschiedene Sozialpolitiken zu entwickeln und so einen Beitrag
zur theoretischen Literatur über die Rolle der Unternehmer bei der Entwicklung der
Sozialpolitik zu leisten.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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While Bismarckian Germany pioneered compulsory insurance policies in the
form of old age, sickness and accident insurance, Weimar Germany ranked as
one of the last European countries to introduce compulsory unemployment
insurance which was legislated only in 1927.
1 A period of intense
experimentation and of bureaucratic and legislative deliberations about
alternative institutional solutions addressing unemployment as a labor market
risk began, however, only in the aftermath of world war I. While the relative
timing of the introduction of compulsory unemployment insurance is itself
puzzling
2, the neglect of the available ‘policy legacies’
3 in the field of
contributory social insurance when addressing the risk of unemployment raises
a number of additional questions pertaining to the mode of institutionalization of
different social risks within the welfare state: How is the mix between the
principle of relief and insurance in social policy achieved? How does the
process of social definition and understanding of a social risk (a process of
collective representation) influence the process of institutional and policy
design? What is the relative role of unions, employers and the state in the
development of social policy?
The political process as a result of which a solution to the risk of
unemployment was institutionalized within the German welfare state sets
unemployment apart from the other major social risks (such as old age,
sickness or accidents), both with regard to the ideational process of social
                                                          
1 This is a fact noted by a number of accounts of German social policy. Among many others,
Gerhard Ritter noted the absence of unemployment policies in Imperial Germany. “The Great
gap in Germany´s system of social security before 1914 was its lack of any adequate
provisions against the effects of unemployment.” Ritter, Gerhard, Social Welfare in Germany
and Britain: Origins and Developments, Leamington Spa, p. 94, See also Steinmetz, George,
1990, Regulating the Social, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 163.
2 In comparative perspective, the relative order of the introduction of institutional solutions to the
various labor market risks is less of a ´puzzle´: as Jens Alber has observed in two thirds of
Western European countries unemployment insurance was the last of the four major
insurance forms to be introduced and in no country it was the first. Alber, Jens, 1982, Vom
Armenhaus zum Wohlfahrtsstaat. Analyse zur Entstehung der Sozialversicherung in
Westeuropa, Frankfurt: Campus, p. 49. The puzzle is the lateness vis-à-vis the other
European countries.
3 On the concept of policy legacies see among others, Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, 1985,
State Structures and the Possibilities for Keynesian responses to the Great Depression in
Sweden, Britain and the United States, in Evans, Peter, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and
Skocpol, Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Pierson, Paul, 1993, When Effect Becomes Cause. Policy Feedback and Political Change,
World Politics 45 (July 1993), pp. 595- 628.2
definition of unemployment as a labor market risk
4 and with regard to the policy
process of institutional design. For almost half a century unemployment was
considered as an uninsurable risk, resulting from individual unwillingness to
work, rather than from broader economic and labor market circumstances and,
as a result, traditional insurance techniques were viewed as inappropriate
remedies for the risk of unemployment.
5 Employers, in particular, denounced
any legislative proposals to insure against unemployment as a labor market risk
as a “state recognition of a cancer which carries the signs of a crippled
condition and of inferiority”
6 or as “a premium for laziness,”
7 but even unions
were, for a long period, undecided about the commensurability between the risk
of unemployment and the other labor market risks.
The most significant difference between the institutionalization of the risk of
unemployment and the other labor market risks lies, however, in the process of
institutional and policy design. The organization of institutional solutions to the
risk of unemployment started as a system of poor relief with means-tested
benefits, distributed through the communes: a paradoxical outcome given the
policy legacies in the field of contributory social insurance and given a prior
limited introduction of the Ghent system.
8 An experimental and improvised
                                                          
4 On the importance of the process of collective representation of unemployment as a risk, its
independence of unemployment and its independent causal effect, see Piore Michael J.,
1987, Historical Perspectives and the Interpretation of Unemployment, Journal of Economic
Literature, December 1987, 25: 4, pp. 1934- 1950; Salais, Robert, Bavarez, Nicolas and
Reynaud, Bénédicte, eds., 1986, L’invention du chomage, Paris: PUF.
5 On this see also Stephan Leibfried, Die Institutionalisierung der Arbeitslosenversicherung in
Deutschland, in Kritische Justiz, 10. Jg, 1977, pp. 189- 301. Leibfried´s considerations about
the difficulties involved in finding an insurance solution are, however, insufficient as an
explanation of the particular pattern of institutionalization of unemployment within the German
welfare state, the political struggles among key actors are absent.
6 Entschliessung der deutschen Handelskammer Hannover, April 1922, quoted in Führer, Karl
Christian, 1990, Arbeitslosigkeit und die Entstehung der Arbeitslosenversicherung in
Deutschland, Berlin: Colloquium, pp. 212- 213. The entire quote is: “Ein Volk von gesunder
Willenskraft und vorwärtsstrebender Energie gibt sich doch nicht selbst ein Gesetz über die
Versicherung der Arbeitslosigkeit, d. h. der staatlichen Anerkennung eines Krebsschadens,
den Stempel der Minderwertigkeit und Krüppelhaftigkeit”.
7 See “Zur Frage der Arbeitslosigkeit”, in Der Arbeitgeber, Nr. 2, 15. 01. 1914, p. 18. On
employers view of unemployment as a self-caused phenomenon, see among others, “Zur
Arbeitslosenfürsorge”, in Der Arbeitgeber, 1. August 1910, p. 178; “Von der
Arbeitslosenversicherung”, Der Arbeitgeber, 1. November 1913; “Die Stellung der
Arbeitgeber zur Arbeitslosenversicherung”, Der Arbeitgeber, 15. November 1913, p. 274.
8 Prior to the Erwerbslosenfürsorge, the Ghent system was introduced by 14 German
communes. (Strasbourg in 1907; Erlangen and Mühlhausen in 1909; Freiburg in 1910; Berlin
Schöneberg and Mannheim in 1911; Schwäbisch Gmünd and Stuttgart in 1912;
Kaiserslautern, Offenbach, Esslingen and Feuerbach (Stuttgart) in 1913; Heidelberg in 1914;
Ludwigshafen in 1917.) Usually communes paid 50% and unions 50% of the benefits. See P.
Nagel, Das Genter System, Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung, 20. November 1921, (20), Nr. 47.
On employers opposition to the introduction of the Ghent system and on employers’ influence
in local parliaments (Kommunalparlamente), see Hans-Joachim Henning, 1974,
Arbeitslosenversicherung vor 1914: Das Genter System und seine Übernahme in3
system of unemployment compensation (the Erwerbslosenfürsorge
9) emerged
in the aftermath of world war I, replacing the policies of unemployment
compensation that had been in place during the war (the
Kriegserwerbslosenfürsorge
10) as a last minute attempt of fearful elites to
counteract the social and political revolution of 1918. This ad-hoc and
improvised policy of unemployment compensation was intended as a provisory
solution that should not be in place for more than one year. Yet the technical
and organizational issues that were posed by the choice of an assistance or
insurance system, the appropriate arena (national, regional or local) where
unemployment policies should be organized, the financing of the system
(general or contributory finance) prolonged its life to nine years. Although the
first draft of an unemployment insurance law was published by the
Reichsarbeitsamt in 1920
11, it took seven years of further delays, caused by
deliberations and negotiations among the social actors until a system of
contributory unemployment insurance was finally put in place.
What accounts for the mode of institutionalization of the risk of
unemployment within the German welfare state -- the surprising absence of the
Ghent system (despite the presence of strong and well organized unions) and the
rejection of a tax-financed system of unemployment assistance in favor of a
system of contributory insurance? The explanation lies neither in the role of pre-
existing institutional legacies, nor in the enlightenment of state bureaucracies or
in the power and strength of the organized working class. Rather, I will argue,
the key political role played by crucial sectors of organized employers can
explain both the timing and the particular institutional choice that was reached
in the final unemployment insurance bill. Throughout this period, employers
have opposed a Ghent system as a form of subsidization of unions strike
funds.
12 For a long period of time, employers rejected an insurance solution to
                                                                                                                                                                         
Deutschland, in Kellenbenz, Hermann, ed., Wirtschaftspolitik und Arbeitsmarkt, München:
Oldenberg, pp. 271- 288.
9 See Verordnung über die Erwerbslosenfürsorge vom 13. 11. 1918, Reichsgesetzblatt 1919, pp.
1305- 1309; on the day-to-day contradictions within the policy see Lewek, op. cit.
10 On the Kriegserwerbslosenfürsorge, see Wermel, Michael and Urban, Roswitha, 1949,
Arbeitslosenfürsorge und Arbeitslosenversicherung, in Neue Soziale Praxis, Heft 6, Nr. 1-3,
München.
11 See first draft of unemployment insurance law together with a justification (Begründung) in
Reichsarbeitsblatt 18: 1920, Berlin: Carl Heymanns, pp. 391 ff. It is significant, for my critique
of an explanation based on policy legacies, that this first draft considered the existing social
policy legislation as the basis and as a blueprint for the unemployment insurance legislation,
this was however rejected by the major social actors. On this, see also, Wermel and Urban,
op. cit., Heft 2, p. 30.
12 On employers opposition to the Ghent system see, among others, Das Problem der
Arbeitslosenversicherung, in Der Arbeitgeber, 1. Januar 1910; Zur Arbeitslosenfürsorge, in
Der Arbeitgeber, 1. August 1910; Der deutsche Städtetag und die Arbeitslosenversicherung,
and Henning, op. cit.4
the risk of unemployment,
13 effectively blocking policy deliberations about the
transformation of the provisory Erwerbslosenfürsorge into a permanent system
of unemployment insurance and prolonging the state of policy improvisation.
However, employers preferences about the institutional solution to the risk of
unemployment changed. Their dissatisfaction with the means-tested system of
unemployment compensation resulted from their absence of control over the
process of monitoring of the willingness to work of the unemployed, over the
relationship of the unemployment compensation to the minimal regional wage
and over the definition of acceptable jobs (zumutbare Arbeit) that the
unemployed had to accept (policy decisions which under the system of
unemployment assistance were in the hands of the communes) and as a result
of the downward pressures on the wages of skilled workers, exerted by flat-rate
unemployment benefits. Their dissatisfaction with the system of unemployment
assistance led to employers’ endorsement of the insurance solution to the risk
of unemployment, despite the potentially higher costs they would carry under a
contributory system of unemployment insurance.
14 Unlike employers in the
United States, whose “true preference was for no insurance plan at all”
15
German employers viewed the insurance solution to the risk of unemployment
as the preferred institutional outcome.
16
                                                          
13 This rejection goes back to the Imperial Period. On the attitudes of German employers
towards social policy in the period 1890- 1914, see, among others, Anselm Faust, 1986,
Arbeitsmarktpolitik im deutschen Kaiserreich: Arbeitsvermittlung, Arbeitsbeschaffung und
Arbeitslosenunterstützung 1890- 1918, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
14 In fact, given the lack of statistical knowledge about the extent of unemployment and the
relative costs of one system versus the other, there was wide uncertainty of employers
whether one system would impose higher costs than the other. The Mitteilungen of the VDA
of 1923 estimated that an insurance system would impose higher costs on employers than
the Erwerbslosenfürsorge (primarily because of the elimination of the means-test). See also,
F. Tänzler, Die Soziale Belastung der deutschen Wirtschaft, Reichsarbeitsblatt:
Nichtamtlicher Teil, Nr. 28, pp. 608- 612; Die soziale Belastung der deutschen Wirtschaft,
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1924, Nr. 24 (November 8, 1924); On arguments that an insurance
system would actually impose lower costs on employers, see Böhm, Gustav, 1924, Bedeutet
die Ersetzung der Erwerbslosenfürsorge durch die Arbeitslosenversicherung eine
Mehrbelastung der Wirtschaft?, in Reichsarbeitsblatt, Nr. 27, pp. 591- 593.
15 An argument made by Paul Pierson, 1995, The Scope and Nature of Business Power:
Employers and the American Welfare State, 1900- 1935, page 36, footnote 79. By making
the distinction between ‘strategic’ and ‘true’ preferences, the essay raises the question which
is pertinent to the German context, as well, whether employers support for the insurance
solution was not just a strategic calculation resulting from employers’ anticipation of the fact
that their ‘true’ political preference (no insurance plan at all) might be defeated. To avoid this
political setback, employers cooperated to the unemployment insurance solution. But, in the
German context, employers cooperation came in a period of employers’ strength, not
weakness (1918) and after considerable success in blocking policy alternatives which were
not acceptable to them, such as the Ghent system. The historical and archival record shows
countless statements of support by employers of the insurance solution (see below) even in
writings addressed to the relevant ministries of the bureaucracy and which were not just for
the public record.
16 On employers’ support for the insurance solution, see for example Geschäftsbericht der
Vereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände 1925/1926, Berlin, 1927, p. 153. “ Aus
diesen Gründen ist die Vereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände auch grundsätzlich5
Once employers ‘principled’ opposition against the insurability of the risk of
unemployment and against a contributory system of unemployment insurance
was overcome, employers actively participated in the policy decisions
surrounding the organization of unemployment insurance. This change in the
preference of employers and their final collaboration in the introduction of
unemployment insurance is the crucial factor which facilitated the passing of
the unemployment insurance bill in 1927. Employers’ participation in the policy
deliberations influenced significant policy decisions within the system of
unemployment insurance bill, such as the organization of the unemployment
insurance risk pool (the position of occupations with either high seasonal or low
unemployment and the degree of contributions they had to pay as well as the
organization of risk pools at the regional level to make possible an increase in
the decision-making power of the labor exchanges over the level of
unemployment contributions that had to be raised), the relationship between
the level of contributions and the wage structure (Lohnklassen) and over the
instruments and institutions of ‘control’
17 of the ability and willingness to work of
the unemployed.
The goal of this paper is to account for the mode of institutionalization of
the risk of unemployment within the German welfare state, by focusing on the
political role played by organized employers. Given the importance of the
change in the preference of employers about the appropriate institutional
solution to the risk of unemployment, the emphasis of the theoretical argument
will be on understanding the determinants of employers preferences towards
social policy and of an intersectoral conflict among employers over alternative
                                                                                                                                                                         
kein Gegner der Schaffung eines Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetzes und hat auch positiv an
dem Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz mitgearbeitet.” On the support of employers in large
firms of unemployment insurance, see among others, G. Erdmann, Das Gesetz über
Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitlosenversicherung, Der Arbeitgeber, Nr. 15, 1. August 1927, p.
362. “Die grundsätzliche Frage, ob eine Änderung dieses Systems (der
Erwerbslosenfürsorge, n.a.) dieses nur kurz angedeutete Verwaltungsdurcheinander in ein
geordnetes, einheitliches Versicherungssystem zweckmässig und notwendig erscheint, ist
auch von der deutschen Arbeitgeberschaft bejaht worden.” In the discussion of the fourth
draft of the unemployment insurance bill, even employers of small firms overcame their
opposition to an insurance solution and signaled their willingness to cooperate. See
Handwerk und Arbeitslosenversicherung, Das deutsche Handwerksblatt, 20: 21, 1.
November 1926, p. 17. “In der Stellungnahme zu dem vorliegenden vierten Entwurf der
Arbeitslosenversicherung hat daher auch die Geschäftsstelle ihre grundsätzliche
Verhandlungsbereitschaft zum Ausdruck gebracht.” The committee of Reichsverband des
deutschen Handwerks has approved the plans of unemployment insurance in its meeting of
October 8th, 1926. See J. Dethloff, Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die
Arbeitslosenversicherung,  Das deutsche Handwerksblatt, 21: 2, 15. Januar 1927, p. 37. “Das
Handwerk hat grundsätzlich dem Gedanken der Arbeitslosenversicherung zugestimmt".
17 Employers’ view of social policy as instruments of social control that discipline the workforce.
My argument is a reversal of the traditional arguments that view means-tested system as
examples of social control. See Piven and Cloward, Regulating the Poor. From the
perspective of employers, quite the opposite is the case, contributory systems increase their
ability to exert control over the level of benefits.6
policy and institutional solutions to the risk of unemployment. The question of
employers preferences towards social policy is significant for the recent
literature that attempt bring together models of the political economy and
models of social policy.
This paper proceeds in several parts. In Part I, I will review significant
debates and will situate the argument of this essay within the existing literature.
The explanation of this paper will provide a number of variables for
understanding employers preferences towards social policies. Specifying
employers preference towards social policy constitutes a significant
improvement over existing theories that either assume a generic opposition of
employers towards social policy, that bracket out the question of employers
preferences, by focusing, instead on the political influence of business within
the process of social policy formation or that provide anecdotal references to
employers support for particular social policies which are not grounded in the
self-interested behavior of employers and lack theoretical microfoundations.
The second part will further explore the question of employers’ preferences, by
focusing on the sectoral divisions among organized employers over the
insurability of certain labor market risks, on the issue of financing social policies
and on the need to use social policy as an instrument of social control. The next
sections will focus on the political process of institutionalization of the risk of
unemployment within the German welfare state, from the
Kriegserwerbslosenfürsorge to the final unemployment insurance act in 1927,
with a particular focus on the organization of the risk pool within the
unemployment insurance bill and the relationship of unemployment benefits to
wages.
2. THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS PREFERENCES TOWARDS
SOCIAL POLICY
The role of employers in the development of the modern welfare state and the
question of employers preferences towards social policy have been very little
understood by political scientists. I will focus only on three reasons of this
intellectual omission or misspecification.
The most significant explanation of the misunderstanding of the role played
by employers in the development of the modern welfare state is the intellectual
dominance by a tradition of research that has emphasized the role played by
the working class as the most important protagonist demanding social policy7
expansion
18 within the field of comparative social policy. In part, these
explanations have been facilitated by what appeared to be an ‘unambiguous’
and ‘natural’ preference of workers for social policy as a compensatory
mechanism for their disadvantaged position in the labor market (and by a
difficulty encountered by attempts to appropriately characterize the preference
of other social actors towards social policy). These perspectives, postulating a
strong link between strong and well organized labor and redistributive
universalistic and solidaristic social policies have come, recently under strong
attack. Peter Baldwin´s research
19 had forcefully undermined the laborist
interpretation of the origin of modern social policy based on the empirical cases
where the laborist claim was strongest -- the Scandinavian countries -- through
a research that highlights the crucial role played by ‘middle classes’ in welfare
state development. Simultaneously, political economists -- such as Peter
Swenson
20 -- have started to pay increasing attention to the importance of
employers for the development of a number of institutional arrangements, that
had been viewed by an earlier generation of scholars as resulting form the
institutional power of the working class: most significant being the
reinterpretation of the role played by organized employers in the origin of
centralized wage-bargaining institutions.
The second analytical difficulty faced by an explanation trying to explore
the role played by organized employers in the development of the welfare state
is linked to the specification of social policy in the current literature. The
difficulty arises from the fact that the dominant theoretical models of social
policy explain cross-national variation in social policy in terms of two latent
variables -- ‘decommodification’ and ‘restratification’.
21 This is a very important
                                                          
18 This is a vast tradition of research. Among many other influential works see Walter Korpi,
1978, The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden; John
D. Stephens, 1979, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, London, Gosta Esping-
Andersen, 1985, Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power, Princeton:
Princeton University Press; Robert Erikson, et. al., eds., 1987, The Scandinavian Welfare
State: Welfare States and Welfare Research, Armonk, in particular the chapter by Gosta
Esping Andersen and Walter Korpi, From Poor Relief to Institutional Welfare States: The
Development of Scandinavian Social Policy.
19 Peter Baldwin, 1990, The Social Bases of the Welfare State, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
20 Swenson, Peter, 1991, Bringing Capital Back In or Social Democracy Reconsidered, World
Politics, 43: 4, July 1991.
21 On this specification of social policy, see Gosta Esping Andersen, op. cit., 1990, pp. 21- 26.
Decommodification refers to institutional guarantees and rights given to the employees
outside and independent of the labor market contracts. Restratification refers to the ability of
the welfare state to undo the class and status segmentation created by the market, on the
one hand, and to add new stratification principles that result from the institutional logic of the
welfare state itself. However, Gosta Esping Andersen offers no conclusive empirical
evidence that ‘restratification’ and ‘decommodification’, as underlying dimensions of welfare
regimes represent the only two possible axes along which we may measure the
institutionalization of the welfare states as well as their interference in the labor market.
Based on theoretical justifications alone, additional latent variables could be identified.8
step away from earlier models that focus solely on differences in aggregate
expenditures on social policy as measures and indicators of cross national
differences among welfare states. The problem arises from the fact that both
variables result from working class demands towards social policy and they
reflect interpretations by the working class of the functions and role played by
the welfare state
22. But ‘decommodification’ and ‘restratification’ offer very little
guidance in understanding cross-sectoral and cross-national preferences of
employers towards the welfare state, in order to answer the question: what
does social policy represent to employers? To address this question, additional
‘instrumental’ variables that characterize cross-national differences in social
policy and that can be, in a systematic manner, related to employers
preferences towards social policy need to be found. The question of employers
preferences towards social policies is linked to a theoretical redefinition of the
functions and role of social policy itself.
Recent theoretical contributions
23 have attempted to respecify the
redistributive mechanisms of social policy as instruments of risk redistribution
and not income redistribution
24 or system of decommodification, as the
functions of the welfare state have been conceptualized by the power
resources perspective, as part of a theoretical program that has attempted to
expand the analysis of societal bases of the welfare state, of groups that have
an interest in welfare state expansion away from the working class. “As
economic producers or as members of different classes, individuals were still
treated unlike by the market and by existing hierarchies. But as creatures
subject to risk they could stand equal, mortals buffeted by misfortune and
unsettled by insecurity.”
25 But while Peter Baldwin uses the concept of risk to
analyze the emergence of universalistic social policies, his analysis deliberately
leaves out policies in which employers played a significant role in defining the
institutions of risk redistribution, such as unemployment or accident
compensation (and where solidarism has been unsuccessful or has failed) as
‘clientelistic’ and, ultimately, ‘uninteresting for social policy’. “Many aspects of
the welfare state are clientelistic, in the sense that their constituencies have
                                                                                                                                                                         
Second, Gosta Esping Andersen suggests no disaggregation of the two latent dimensions
along which welfare regimes cluster. For example, we have no a-priori reason to believe that
‘decommodification’ is a one-dimensional linear variable and that welfare regimes vary from
high-decomodifying to low decommodifiying.
22 As Esping Andersen notes, de-commodification has “been a priority for labor.” Op. cit., 1990,
p. 22.
23 The most significant author in this respect remains Francois, Ewald, 1986, L’état Providence,
Paris: PUF, See also Ewald, Francois, Insurance and Risk , in Burchell, Graham, 1991, ed.,
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London: Harvester, pp. 197- 211; Ewald,
Francois, Old Age as Risk, in Anne-Marie Guillemard, ed., Old Age and the Welfare State,
London: Sage, pp. 115-127.
24 “The welfare state decisively advanced society’s ability to treat each of its members equally. It
did so, however, less by redistributing wealth than by reapportioning the costs of risk and
mischance.” Peter Baldwin, op. cit., p. 1.
25 Peter Baldwin, 1990, op. cit., p. 2.9
largely been set by definition. The issue they raise have therefore rarely passed
beyond the calculations of how generous a treatment a particular group can
wrest from society as a whole. That unemployment insurance has, until recently
been the concern mainly of wage earners or that measures against work
accidents are a matter of most pressing interest to the industrial proletariat will
come as no surprise. There has been little to distinguish the politics of
implementing or resisting these initiatives from the battles surrounding other,
equally clientelistic measures aimed at different social groups: tariffs, for
example, or the subsidies, price supports, protection against foreclosure and
other generous measures responsible for channeling substantial public
resources in the direction of agrarian classes. Disputes of this sort (...) were in
no sense specific to social policy.”
26
Accident and unemployment insurance represent, however, crucial cases
for a comparative theory of social policy that problematizes the notion of risk,
asking how different social risks become institutionalized within the welfare
state, what the boundaries between public and private institutions are and what
the appropriate mix between insurance and assistance is -- and cannot be
avoided or a priori dismissed as irrelevant or unspecified to social policy. These
policies undermine Peter Baldwin´s claim about the equality in the position from
which all members of society face risks: risk means a different thing to
employers (and the particular meaning is linked to the structural position of that
group within the political economy). Employers participation in the process of
social policy development results from their desire to shape the institutions that
define the criteria of compensation for the various social risks, so as to
minimize the costs they bear, which at the same time retaining and ‘rewarding’
the skilled segment of their workforce. The political struggle between employers
and employees over the choice of institutional mechanisms that redistribute
risks (a theme which is absent from Peter Baldwin´s analysis) is,
simultaneously, linked to related economic and labor market decisions, such as
the levels of the appropriate skills in the economy and the compensation of the
employees for the investment in their skills or the degree of political intervention
in the labor market or the functions and role of labor market contracts.
The existing literature attempting to characterize the degree of employers
influence within the political system in general has either mischaracterized the
political preference of employers towards social policy or has been silent about
the issue altogether. Arguments about the structural power of business have
‘bracketed out’ the issue of employers preference towards social policy, by
starting from an (empirically untenable) assumption of employers opposition
towards social policy
27 -- an assumption that fails to account for the tremendous
                                                          
26 Peter Baldwin, op. cit., p. 50.
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New York: Basic Books. See, for instance, Lindblom’s statement that businessmen must be
induced to perform a public role commensurate to their degree of power, In op. cit., p.10
(cross-national, cross-sectoral and across different policies) variation in the
degree of business support or opposition towards different social policies. The
recent literature that has focused on the degree of business influence in the
policy-making process (and how this influence should be conceptualized
28) and
that attempts to bring together the arguments about the structural power of
business of the 1970´s and the more recent institutionalist writings is, in effect,
equally indeterminate about the question of preferences of employers towards
social policy: one needs a prior specification of the preferences of employers to
specify the anticipated reaction of the policy-makers to the veto of employers’
structural power. If, as Paul Pierson notes, “not all social policies activate the
signaling device”, a correct specification of  employers preferences would
address the question that is unanswered by this approach: which social policies
(and which institutional solutions to them) are acceptable and even desired by
employers?
Existing attempts to address the issue of employers preference towards
social policy that have been developed mostly to account for the support of
employers towards some social policies -- a surprising finding for the structural
power of business explanation -- are not grounded in the self-interested
behavior of employers and lack convincing micro-foundations.
29 The welfare
capitalist approach
30, or, in the German tradition, authors concerned with
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National Patterns in Company Innovation Strategies: A Comparative Institutional Approach,
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30 The most important empirical reference of welfare capitalist scholars is the social security act
of 1935. See Jill Quadagno, 1988, The transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics
in the American Welfare State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Jill Quadagno, 1985,
Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935, American Sociological Review, 49
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enterprise based social policies
31 have approximated employers preferences
towards social policy by starting with employers concern towards enterprise-
based social policies. The practices of enterprise paternalism of firms such as
Krupp or Siemens were viewed by authors such as Jürgen Kocka as an
indication of social policy understanding of German employers as a unique and
skillful blending of paternal care and social control and as an anticipation of
employers’ social policy demands from the state: social policy, it is argued, was
viewed by these employers as an expansion of their managerial practices at the
national level. However, evidence of enterprise-level social policies (sometimes
a resultant of employers generosity at other times resulting from the desire to
retain skilled workers in periods of labor shortages) can be viewed only as the
starting point of the exploration of employers preferences towards ‘national
level’ social policies, since the organizational and institutional questions posed
by the choice of particular social policies pose different dilemmas and trade-off
to employers.
2. 1. Risk and social policy
Rather than being concerned with the ‘decommodifying’ aspects of social
policy, employers understanding of the welfare state centers around the various
labor market risks
32 that the employees of their enterprises face, labor market
risks which cannot be addressed with the use of labor market contracts
33.
Employers’ preoccupation with social policies in neither grounded in paternal
benevolence and care, nor in a desire to achieve unregulated labor markets,
                                                          
31 For the German context, see Kocka, Jürgen, Unternehmensverwaltung und
Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847- 1914, Stuttgart: Ernst Klett; Kocka, Jürgen,
1980, The Modern Industrial Enterprise in Germany, in Alfred D. Chandler and Herman
Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern
Enterprise, Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Pohl, Hans and Treue, Wilhelm, eds.,
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Rheinisch- Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv.
32The labor market risks that result form the employment relationship are, due to their immediate
impact on the day to day work organization the most important social policy issues employers
are concerned about. Social policies that have a more remote and indirect link with the
employment relationship (such as housing policy) are hypothesized to be less of a concern
for employers.
33 In fact, there have been attempts to address the labor market risks (in particular the risk of
workplace accidents with the use of contracts). Both German employers and the
Kathedersocialists considered the possibility of higher wages which should act as a risk
premium. On this, see Isabela Mares, From Contracts and Liability Laws to Modern Social
Insurance: The Institutionalization of the Risk of Workplace Accidents, chapter 3 of Ph.D.
Dissertation, Harvard University, work in progress.12
but rather, in their attempts to redefine the labor market risks -- such as
unemployment, accident, sickness -- in order to redirect and redistribute their
incidence. At certain moments, private institutional arrangements addressing
particular labor market risks will be preferred by employers -- employers will
then oppose welfare state expansion -- at other moments employers will be in
the forefront of demands for political intervention that takes the risks out of the
sphere of negotiation among private individuals or societal groups, and by,
incorporating them within the sphere of public law, creates the possibility of a
wider redistribution of the risks across several occupational categories
34.
The underlying ‘distribution’ and ‘structure’ of the risk is a variable that
influences employers preference towards social policy. Two things seem to
matter here. The first is that labor market risk have different underlying
distributions -- highly concentrated, such as the risk of workplace accidents, or
diffuse risks, such as the risk of old age, ‘normally’ distributed across the labor
market population. Concentrated labor market risks facilitate coordinated action
among employers in the search of institutional solutions to these risks
35. The
distribution of the risk is, in turn, shaped by past policies and pre-existing
institutional arrangements. Consider the following example. Most of the XIX-th
century tort law and legal practices did not consider employers liable for the
risks of workplace accidents
36 and, as a result, the burden of the risk was totally
shifted towards employees. It was only as a result of a series of court
developments and legal changes such as Employer Liability Laws (that held
employers liable for the accidents that occurred within particular firms or that
resulted form the errors of supervising personnel) that the burden of the risk
was, in part, shifted back to employers. Under both legal regimes, the
underlying distribution of the risk is the same (one can more or less assume
that the number of accidents is constant) yet the implications for employers are
very different in both cases.
A few hypotheses can be derived from these considerations. All things
equal, one expects employers in sectors affected by concentrated risks to be
collectively engaged in searches for social policy development as opposed to
employers in sectors who are not affected by these risks. One expects to find a
higher degree of concern of employers towards concentrated risks (workplace
accidents) than diffuse risks (unemployment). One expects employers affected
by concentrated risks to attempt to use social policy as an institutional
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Imperial Germany where employers rejected the private law reliance on courts and a
demanded public law solution.
35 I would like to thank Torben Iversen for helping me clarify this point.
36 See, for example, Epstein, Richard A., 1982, The Historical Origin and Economic Structure of
Workers’ Compensation Law, Georgia Law Review, 16: 4, 1982, pp. 775- 819 (discusses
both US and UK legal cases), for Germany, see Gitter, Wolfgang, 1969, Die Soziale
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mechanism that redistributes the risk across wider sectors (and employers
unaffected by the risk to resist inclusion in a wide risk pool).
2. 2. The institutional preferences of employers: costs and locus of
control
While risk as a variable can give a rough indication of the nature of employers’
interests and preoccupation with different social policies and can approximate
the variation in the degree of employers support across different policy areas,
how do employers choose among alternative institutional solutions to a
particular labor market risk? What variables determine their institutional
preference? I will suggest that two variables are relevant here: (1) the costs
alternative institutional arrangements impose on employers as well as the ability
of different industries to carry the costs of one scheme versus another and (2)
the locus of control over the significant policy decisions within each institutional
solution.
Firms capacity to carry the costs of social policies varies. Employers in
large firms in sheltered domestic markets have a higher capability to carry the
costs of contributory social insurance than firms competing in export markets;
so are ‘large’ firms as compared with ‘small’ firms. As a result, one expects to
find strong sectoral conflict among employers with regard to the preferred
institutional outcome. As Peter Baldwin has argued, the predominant position
enjoyed by small firms in Sweden and Denmark at the turn of the century has
led to a choice of a universalistic, tax-financed social policies -- Bismarckian
Germany, dominated by producers of iron and steel in sheltered domestic
markets is the opposite case
37. The choice of contributory social insurance
(and, as in the case of accident insurance, the explicit rejection by employers of
state contributions to the accident insurance fund) is a consequence of the
lower cost constraint that is characteristic to these firms.
A number of variables affect the cost profile of a particular social policy: the
degree of contributions, the level of benefits, the degree of state subsidies or
supplement to a contributory insurance, the number of the industries across
which the particular risk is distributed (and their risk profile). But costs are not
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the only determinant of employers choice among alternative social policy
arrangements. The second relevant variable is the degree of control employers
can exert over policy decisions such as the level of contributions, the
relationship between contributions and wages, the possibility of using social
policy benefits as disciplinary devices that ‘reward’ the loyal and high skilled
and discipline or punish those considered ‘unwilling’ to work.
38 The
dissatisfaction with their ability to exercise control over these decisions (which
can be in the hand of bureaucrats or politicians or, as in the case of
compensations for workplace accidents, in the hands of the courts) can
influence employers’ willingness to exchange higher costs (in the form of higher
contributions or a reorganization of the risk pool) for a higher degree of control.
All things equal, one expects that the higher degree of reliance of firms on high-
skilled workforce to increase their desire to use social policy as an instrument of
social control. Viewed against this background, the change in the preference of
German employers and the acceptance of contributory unemployment
insurance is less surprising. As employers’ of large firms resented their lack of
control over policy decisions such as the monitoring of the willingness of work
of the unemployed and level of unemployment benefits, they were willing to pay
higher costs in the form of contributions in exchange for higher control; smaller
firms, unable or unwilling to pay these contributions and less concerned with
the issue of control altogether preferred a tax-financed solution to
unemployment insurance.
                                                          
38 On Bismarckian social policies as ‘rewards’ for Germany’s labor aristocracy see Gerhard
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Table 1
Sectoral Preferences of Employers towards the organization of unemployment
insurance
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3. UNEMPLOYMENT AS RISK: FROM THE MEANS-TESTED TO
THE INSURANCE SOLUTION
3. 1. Employers and the system of Unemployment Assistance
The fear of the social unrest and unpredictable political consequences of the
demobilization of six million soldiers after world war I led to employers’
participation the effort of other political elites and their acceptance of a
temporary system of unemployment assistance. Their qualified support of the
system of unemployment assistance (Erwerbslosenfürsorge) represented a
major departure from employers opposition to any policy that should
compensate against the effects of unemployment, a position employers
defended throughout the Imperial Period
41. Originally, employers had no reason
                                                          
39 The term belongs to Gary Herrigel. See Herrigel, Gary, 1995, Industrial Constructions: The
Sources of German Industrial Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
40 I refer here to the need and desire of employers to exert control over the system of
unemployment compensation.
41 On employers opposition to any policy that should compensate against the effect of
unemployment during the Imperial Period, see Wermel and Urban, op. cit., Heft 1, pp. 15- 59;16
of dissatisfaction with the system of unemployment assistance: it was designed
as a provisory measure and it imposed no costs on employers, since system of
unemployment assistance was financed by the state, Länder and communes
42.
Reasons of dissatisfaction appeared immediately. A major complaint of
employers, which became a constant theme in their statements about the
Erwerbslosenfürsorge was that the level of benefits which were set by the
communes were too high, undermining the minimal local wage.
43 But it was not
the actual level of the benefits that, in the long run, was the major reason of
employers’ dissatisfaction with the system of unemployment assistance, but
their flat rate character. Flat rate benefits that were not tied to the prior wages
or qualifications of employees represented a higher loss of income for the high-
skilled and increased the pressure on them to accept a job, even if lower paid.
A flat rate system of unemployment benefits undermined the skill qualifications
of the high skilled segment of the workforce. During the periods of increase in
unemployment, when firms had to lay off even high skilled workers (1925 and
1926), the downward pressure on the wages of the high skilled workers
became a major concern for employers. Instead of a flat-rate system of
unemployment benefits, employers in large firms relying on skilled workers
favored a system in which levels of unemployment benefits were tied to prior
wages, a Lohnklassensystem.
The second reason of employers dissatisfaction with the system of
unemployment assistance resulted from their absence of control over the
institutions that monitored the willingness of the unemployed to accept a job
and over the political decisions that define the conditions of reemployment
(such as the definition of jobs that the unemployed have to accepts or over the
limit of a period in during which unemployed can refuse a job that does not
correspond to their qualifications). Within the system of unemployment
assistance, these political decisions were in the hand of the communes and
open to multiple political pressures, especially in regions with concentrated
unemployment. example employers complaint about leniency of the communes
The system of unemployment assistance that was established during the
war (Kriegswohlfahrtspflege) made unemployment benefits conditional upon
the acceptance by the unemployed of  ‘appropriate work’ (zumutbare Arbeit).
44
However, the definition of  ‘appropriate work’ was indeterminate and vague and
left to the discretionary power of the communes; so was the implementation of
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punitive and disciplinary measure (withdrawal of unemployment benefits) in
case of refusal of the unemployed to accept jobs that were offered to them.
As a response to the critics of the definition of the conditions of
reemployment (in particular employers) in the system of unemployment
assistance, the Reichsarbeitsamt took some steps in the clarification of the
notion of  ‘appropriate jobs’. Unemployed were required to accept any job that
was offered to them, even if the job did not correspond to their profession and
even if it was not in the same place as the of residence of the unemployed,
provided that the appropriate wage was offered
45, but the unemployed could
refuse a job that did not correspond to his qualifications. But, according to
employers, despite this legal definition clarification, the institutional framework
that monitored the willingness of the unemployed to perform a job and that
could fulfill a disciplining role, by withdrawing unemployment benefits was
incomplete and inefficient. Micro-level studies of the unemployment
compensation in the Weimar period have shown that communes lacked the
organizational capabilities to properly perform a test of willingness of work:
46 the
withdrawal of unemployment benefits in regions of high unemployment was a
social impossibility, given the tremendous political pressure extorted on the
local offices that distributed unemployment benefits.
According to employers, communes lacked the organizational and
institutional resources to perform a test of the ‘need’ of the unemployed, as
well, leading to the persistence of ‘simulated’ and ‘self-caused’ unemployment.
Complaints such as “hundreds of thousands are lazy, while significant
professions vital for the health of the economy such as mining or agriculture cry
for labor forces”, were constantly made by employers of large firms,
47 despite
no real evidence of labor market shortages in agriculture. The inability of the
communes to monitor whether the recipient of unemployment benefits was, in
fact, needy resulted again from a poor specification of the definition of a needy
situation within the system of unemployment assistance, making widespread
variation in the mode in which communes interpreted this provision possible.
The gradual change in the preferences of employers in large firms and their
endorsement of a system of unemployment insurance results from this
dissatisfaction of employers with the system of unemployment assistance. The
desire to exert control over the institutions that determine the conditions of
reemployment made employers willing to accept higher costs that were
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imposed on them by a contributory system of insurance.
48 A change in the in
the sectoral balance of power within the Central Association of German
Employers that took place during this period and the increase in the institutional
influence of employers of export industries (such as chemicals, electricals,
machine tools) over domestic producers (iron and steel)
49 led to a change in the
structure of risk affecting German employers of the VGDA. For employers
dependent on world markets and exposed to wide fluctuations in the demand
for their products, unemployment was a structural and more permanent threat
than to producers in sheltered domestic markets, such as iron and steel. The
institutionalization of a solution to the risk of unemployment required, for the
employers of export firms, both the creation of a large occupational risk pool
that redistributed the risk associated with unemployment as well as institutional
guarantees for their skilled workforce that their investment in skills will not be
undermined during periods of unemployment. Since the system of
unemployment assistance did not offer these guarantees, the Federation of
German employers turned to the system of unemployment insurance as the
preferred institutional alternative.
Given their low reliance of small firms on skilled labor, small firms did not
share the concerns of large export firms about proper guarantees to their
workforce during periods of unemployment and the need to control the system
of unemployment assistance. Due to their precarious economic situation and
the high possibility of bankruptcy, their risk profile was similar to the risk faced
by large firms, yet for them it was the issue and concern of ‘costs’ that prevailed
over all the other considerations. Some individual Chambers of Commerce
demanded the introduction of a tax-financed system of unemployment
insurance
50, in which the general taxpayer (and not employers and employees)
                                                          
48 This change in the preference of employers took place before the Decree (Verordnung) of
1923 which introduced a requirement of contributory payments to the system of
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50 On Individual Chambers of Commerce demanding a tax-financed system of unemployment
assistance, see, for example, Zentrales Staatsarchiv Potsdam, Reichswirtschaftsministerium,
2071/150, Handwerkskammer zu Kassel, Bericht über die Vollversammlung am 28.
November 1921. “Wir sprechen uns gegen die Belastung der Arbeitgeber mit den Beiträgen19
should bear the costs associated with the risk of unemployment, yet this
demand did not become the official statement of the Deutscher Industrie und
Handelstag, nor of the Reichsverband des Deutschen Handwerks. Instead, the
central association chose to adopt a position of rejection and veto, critiquing the
idea of unemployment insurance.
3. 2. Employers and the organization of the insurance solution
As early as  1921, employers overcame their position of veto and opposition to
the insurance solution to the risk of unemployment and actively began to
deliberate the institutional and policy alternatives they were faced with, under a
system of unemployment insurance. The major political choices were related to
the organization of the risk pool to redistribute the differences in regional and
occupational unemployment and the proper institutions of control of the
willingness of work of the unemployed. 
Questions about the appropriate organization of the risk pool within
unemployment insurance dominated the debates about the future shape of the
insurance solution. After 1922, both employers and unions viewed favorably the
creation, via an insurance solution, of a large risk pool that incorporated many
occupations affected, in various degrees by the risk of unemployment and
uniformed the risks both across occupations and across regions; they
disagreed profoundly, on the degree of administrative centralization of this risk
pool. While unions supported the idea of a solidaristic risk pool that was to be
achieved by creating a centralized office and entrusting it with decisions over
unitary levels of benefits, employers preferred more administrative
decentralization in the administration of funds.
According to the deliberations within the Social Policy Committee of the
Employers Association (VDA)
51, the organization of a community of risks
(Gefahrengemeinschaft) was to be guided by two underlying principles: to
counteract the tendency towards spending out of large funds (“Wirtschaften aus
grossen Fonds heraus”
52) and to increase the responsibility of the lowest
administrative units that distribute the unemployment benefits (employers
preferred the labor exchanges, even if the first drafts of the bill made institutions
of sickness insurance responsible for the distribution of unemployment benefits.
By entrusting the labor exchanges with the prerogative to establish the level of
                                                                                                                                                                         
zur Arbeitslosenversicherung aus und beantragen, dass diese Kosten von der Allgemeinheit
des Volkes getragen werden".
51 See Geschäftsbericht der Vereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände 1923/1924, Berlin:
1924, pp. 104 ff. According to employers the system had to be chosen that “contained the
highest guarantees for a sparsame und billige Durchführung der Erwerbslosenfürsorge".
52 Ibid., p. 105.20
contributions, employers hoped to create the necessary incentives that would
lower the administrative costs and keep the level of contributions at a
minimum.
53  An organization of the risk pool which would assign to a centralized
organization decision-making power over the level of unemployment
contributions was, according to employers unacceptable, since it would was an
instrument to keep the level of contributions at high levels „ad infinitum“
54.
According to employers, the ideal institutional solution would entrust labor
exchanges with decisions over the level of contributions, which would have the
effect of a redistribution of the risk only at the level of individual Länder and
would prevent the creation of a  single risk pool for the entire Reich. According
to employers, individual Länder should be given the authority to increase the
level of contributions, in the case of an increase in the level of regional
unemployment, but the idea of a unitary risk pool was unacceptable
55.
Unions (both Christian and ADGB), on the other hand, opposed employers
plans and demanded the elimination of the local autonomy of the labor
exchanges over the level of contributions
56 and a ‘total equalization of risks’
(vollständiger Gefahrenausgleich) between regions with different levels of
unemployment. Yet with regard to the regional organization of the risk pool, the
demands of the unions were not met. The Verordnung of 13. October 1923,
which introduced contributions from employers and employees to the system of
unemployment assistance (transforming it into a hybrid system of
unemployment assistance, financed in part through contributions), created, at
the same time regional ‘contribution communities’ (Beitragsgemeinschaften) of
employers and employees based on the geographical proximity to a labor
exchange. While labor exchanges had the prerogative of establishing the level
of contributions (introducing regional disparities in the level of unemployment
contributions), the Reichsarbeitsministerium retained discretionary power over
the maximum amount of contributions.
It is significant that employers were able to carry out their demands for
maintaining regional disparities in the level of contributions in face of pressures
coming from the bureaucracy, as well.
57As Führer points out, „in the
parliamentary debates about this point, employers were successful in imposing
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their view entirely. No decision was made about a unitary level of contributions
for the entire Reich.”
58 The final unemployment insurance bill maintained
regional disparities in the level of contributions, by institutionalizing a three-
tiered system in which contributions were established. Labor exchanges
maintained their right to determine the level of insurance premiums up to 2% of
the basic wage and two other organizations were established, one at the level
of province and one at the level of Land. These organizations could further
increase the level of contributions, if high and persistent regional
unemployment led to a deficit in the unemployment insurance fund.
Employers were able to influence the decisions of the organization of the
risk pool with regard to the problems of occupational risk pools, as well. Given
the broad variation in the way individual industries were affected by the risk of
unemployment, the important institutional question that had to be solved was
the redistribution of the occupational differences of the risk within the insurance
solution. Should industries characterized by a higher risk of unemployment pay
higher contributions or should all industries pay equal contributions to the
unemployment insurance fund? Should the contributions be paid to a single
fund (leading the creation of a unitary risk pool) or should several different
occupational funds be set up?
The institutional solution to the occupational dimension of the risk of
unemployment was the issue area in which a convergence of the institutional
preferences of the unions and employers became possible. The question about
the institutional solution to the occupational variation in the risk of
unemployment was divisive for both unions and employers. Unions such as the
Liberaler Gewerkschaftsblock DDP had opposed the creation of a unitary risk
pool as a form of  ‘crypto Marxism’
59 and as an attempt on the part of the ADGB
to strengthen their organizational monopoly over industrial unions.
Occupational risk pools had the organizational advantage of strengthening
industrial unions and make them escape the organizational hegemony of
centralized unions: if a differentiated level of unemployment contributions was
                                                          
58 See Führer, op. cit., p. 314. For the relevant record of the parliamentary debate see
Stenographische Berichte des Reichstages, Volume 417, Anlage Nr. 3622, p. 172. Bericht
des 9. Ausschusses (Soziale Angelegenheiten) über den Entwurf eines Gesetzes über
Arbeitslosenversicherung. SPD (deputy Aufhauser) supported the notion of broad solidarity of
risk and demanded the centralization of unemployment insurance. “In keiner anderen
Sozialversicherung sei der Gedanke der Solidarität so angebracht, wie in der
Arbeitslosenversicherung (..) Deshalb verlangt die sozialdemokratische Fraktion die
Festsetzung des Beitrags einheitlich für das ganze Reich durch den Vorstand der
Reichsanstalt.” in op. cit., p. 172. The proposal of the SPD in favor of unitary level of benefits
was rejected. op. cit., p. 173 The introduction of the three tiered system was viewed by
deputy Andre (Zentrum) as a concession to small firms. “Die Festsetzung des einheitlichen
Beitrages rufe den schärfsten Widerstand des Klein- und Mittelbesitzes gegen das Gesetz.”
op. cit., p. 173.
59 See Anton Erkelenz, 1928, Fehler des Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetzes, In Die
Arbeitslosenversicherung, 4. Jahrgang, 1927/28.22
put in place, the payment of unemployment benefits had to be, accordingly,
differentiated and could be negotiated between the individual unions and the
employer association.
60 Throughout the period, centralized socialist unions,
such as the ADGB had consistently supported the idea of a unitary risk pool
and of unitary contributions across all occupations,  that should not be
dependent of the level of unemployment of the respective industry as a broad
form of solidarism of the working class
61.
The fact that the position of the ADGB ultimately prevailed and the solution
of a unitary risk pool with no differentiation in the level of contributions based on
the level of unemployment of the respective industry entered the final
unemployment insurance bill
62 resulted more from a cross-class convergence
of the institutional preferences between these unions and powerful sectors
among employers, rather than the power and influence of the unions alone.
Germany’s export sectors (chemicals, electricals, machine tools) whose
influence within the Central Federation of German Employers increased during
this period (and who, due to their dependence on world markets were exposed
to large and unpredictable fluctuations in the level of unemployment) preferred
the institutional solution of a unitary risk pool which had the advantage of
spreading the risk across a larger number of industries and of keeping the costs
of contributions low. As early as 1920, the Federation of German Employers
had argued in a writing addressed to the RAM that it would have been
impossible for employers in industries with high and recurring levels of
unemployment to pay differentiated contributions from the other industries,
since this would put further strains on the competitivity of their industries.
63 This
demand became part of the resolution of social policy committee of the
Federation of German Employers during the following year, when employers
demanded an exchange of the risks as big as possible (“möglichst grosser
Austausch der Risiken.”
64)
There was, of course, some dissent in the ranks of employers coming from
those industries characterized by low levels of unemployment -- domestic
industries such as iron and steel who had prosperously expanded during the
                                                          
60 On arguments supporting the creation of occupational risk pools, see Hugo Lindemann,
Gewerbedifferenzierte Arbeitslosenfürsorge, Die Arbeit, 1: 1924, Franz Spliedt, Einheitliche
Gefahrengemeinschaft in der Arbeitslosenfürsorge, Die Arbeit, 1: 1924.
61 On the position of the ADGB see Correspondenzblatt der Generalkomission der
Gewerkschaften Deutschlands, 32: 1922, pp. 520; Zum Referentenentwurf des Gesetzes
über Arbeitslosenversicherung, in Arbeit und Beruf, 1: 1921; Vorwärts, 24. 2. 1923.
62 Reference paragraph of the bill about unitary occupational risk pool. According to Karl
Christian Führer, one of the major reasons behind the solution of occupational differentiation
of unemployment in favor of a single risk pool was the prior choice of regional differentiation
in the treatment of unemployment. A further occupational differentiation, according to Führer
would have rendered the system totally incomprehensible. Führer, op. cit.
63 Zentrales Staatsarchiv Potsdam, Reichsarbeitsamt 4310, Denkschrift der Vereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände.
64 Geschäftsbericht der Vereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, 1921, Berlin, p. 27.23
inflationary years of the Weimar period
65 and who, given the stable nature of
the demand for their products, were characterized by lower fluctuations in their
levels of unemployment. For these employers, a unitary risk pool meant the
subsidization of the industries with higher unemployment and they considered
plans for equal contributions paid by all industries as ‘unacceptable’
66. But on
this issue they were defeated within the Central Association of Employers and
the proponents of a single occupational risk pool prevailed.
The arguments of employers in favor of a single occupational risk pool are
reflected in the ‘justification’ which prefaced the unemployment insurance law.
Industries that are characterized by higher levels of unemployment are
precisely those industries that struggle hardest  to stay competitive and by
paying higher contributions to separate occupational risk pools, the
unemployment insurance law would further weaken them
67. A single
occupational risk pool was established by the unemployment insurance law.
The differential insurance costs caused by variations in the degree of seasonal
unemployment were, in part, shifted to the employees, as the law created the
possibility that the level of unemployment benefits of workers in the professions
with high levels of unemployment can be shortened
68 or, to the general
taxpayer, in 1928. Based on the ‘Special Unemployment Assistance for
profession-specific unemployment’ (Sonderfürsorge for berufübliche
Arbeitslosigkeit) unemployment insurance benefits to workers in industries with
high seasonal unemployment were financed out of general taxation, instead of
contributions of employers and employees.
In conclusion to the organization of the unemployment risk pool that
redistributed the variations in regional and seasonal unemployment, employers
of large firms were able to carry out their demands of an institutional solution
both with regard to the redistribution of regional unemployment and with regard
to the redistribution of unemployment across industries that were facing the risk
of unemployment differently. With regard to the first problems, employers
preferred to give large autonomy to the local labor exchanges in determining
the level of unemployment contributions, in order to prevent the centralization of
unemployment insurance fund and to keep administrative costs low. With
regard to the problem of redistribution of the risk across occupations with
                                                          
65 On the overexpansion of iron and steel during the inflationary period see Gerald Feldman, Iron
and Steel and the German inflation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.
66 “Die Großindustrie des hiesigen niederrheinisch westfälischen Industriegebietes, bei der
erfahrungsgmäß die Arbeitslosigkeit selten ist, ist an dieser Frage ungemein interessiert und
hält eine Versicherung, die sie im gleichen Maße wie die Saisongewerbe belästigt, für
unannehmbar.“ Handelskammer Bochum an den Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie
und den Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstag, 19. Oktober 1920, Rheinisch Westfälisches
Wirtschaftsarchiv Köln, Abt. 20, Nr. 583, quoted in Führer, op. cit.
67 Begründung zum Gesetzentwurf zur Arbeitslosenversicherung (III/2), p. 94.
68 AVAVG, § 99, section 2 and § 110, Section 3.24
different levels of unemployment, employers preferred a wide risk pool that
redistributed the risks across all industries and did not raise higher contributions
from industries with higher levels of unemployment.
3. 3. The costs of a contributory system and the relationship
between unemployment benefits and wages
The system of unemployment assistance that was established in 1914
introduced a flat-rate system of unemployment benefits that did not take into
consideration the prior level of wages of the unemployed in calculating the level
of unemployment benefits, but introduced some differentiation based on age or
family circumstances. The same principles (flat-rate unemployment benefits)
were maintained in the policies of unemployment assistance of 1918
(Erwerbslosenfürsorge)
69in which communes were given the authority to
establish the level of unemployment benefits.
Although the original intention of the Reichsarbseitministerium was to have
unemployment benefits very close to the level of the minimal regional wage, the
benefits could not keep up with the growth in prices (in particular during the
period of hyperinflation
70) leading to widespread poverty among the
unemployed. The policy proposals about an indexation of unemployment
benefits were defeated, due in large measure to the opposition of employers
71,
but also to the concerns of the minister of labor Brauns
72 about the financial
sustainability of such a policy.
Besides their constant complaint about the negative impact of high
unemployment benefits that undermined the ‘self-reliance’ and ‘willingness to
work of the unemployed’
73 another reason of employers dissatisfaction with the
system of unemployment assistance was the absence of a relationship
between the unemployment benefits and the prior wages of the unemployed.
While this had a beneficial relationship on the level of unemployment benefits
of the low skilled, for the high skilled workers, on the other hand, the decrease
in real terms of the unemployment benefits increased their pressure to accept
lower paid jobs during periods of unemployment and undermined the
investment in their skills.
                                                          
69 Reichsgesetzblatt 1918, p. 1307.
70 See Wermel and Urban, op. cit., Führer, op. cit., pp. 460.
71 On employers opposition to the indexation of unemployment benefits, see Rundschreiben des
VgDA, Nr. 211, 14. 9. 1923, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, R 11/1428; Führer, op. cit., p. 451.
72 See Führer, op. cit., p. 457.
73 See for example, Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung, Nr. 11, 15. 3. 1925.25
This weakening of existing skill qualifications caused by the flat-rate system
of unemployment assistance led to employers endorsement of policy proposals
of the Reichsarbeitsministerium for a system of unemployment insurance that
tied benefits to the prior wages of the unemployed, proposals that were part of
the third draft of the unemployment insurance law of August 1925
74. Based on
this draft, the ‘level of unemployment benefits had to be determined as a
function of the wages (§ 58). 5 wage categories (Lohnklassen) were created
and the level of unemployment compensation was calculated as a function of
the average wage of the unemployed in the last three months prior to the
condition of unemployment. Unemployment benefits were set at 40% of the
basic wage for each wage category, but supplements for family conditions were
allowed up to a maximum of 65%. During the deliberations of the social policy
committee of the Vereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, employers
welcomed the introduction of this ‘system of wage categories’
(Lohnklassensystem) and the elimination of the income-equalizing effect of a
flat rate system of unemployment assistance
75.
A system of unemployment benefits that was tied to prior levels of wages
had, according to employers, two desirable properties. By lowering the level of
contributions from the low and unskilled, it weakened the possibility that
unemployment benefits undermined the local minimal wage. By raising the level
of unemployment benefits for the high skilled workers, it weakened the labor
market pressure exerted on these workers to accept lower paid work that did
not correspond to their skill qualifications during periods of unemployment. For
employers, it represented an indirect institutional guarantee that high skilled
workers could retain their skills during periods of unemployment.
Unions, on the other hand, opposed the introduction of a system that tied
unemployment benefits to the prior wages of the unemployed.  Based on
unions estimations
76 the majority of the unemployed were concentrated among
                                                          
74 See Wermel and Urban, op. cit.
75 See on this, Geschäftsbericht der Vereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände,
1925/1926, Berlin, 1926, pp. 164-165. “Die Vereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände
hat der Abänderung dieses Systems von vornherein grundsätzlich zugestimmt. Sprechen auf
der einen Seite rein versicherungstechnische Momente dafür, dass auch die Leistung der
Versicherung gestuft wird nach der Höhe des Beitrages, also damit nach der Höhe des
Lohnes, so sind auf der anderen Seite eine Reihe sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Gründe für die
Einführung dieses Systems maßgebend, die sich aus den Erfahrungen in der Praxis, die man
mit dem bisherigen Einheitsunterstützungssatz gemacht hat, als zwingend herausgestellt
haben".
76 Given the lack of available data, the skill distribution of the unemployed was subject to
widespread speculation and there was widespread disagreement between unions and
employers with regard to the distribution across different occupational categories. While
unions speculated that the unemployed are mostly concentrated among the low-skilled,
according to employers, 60% of the unemployed were in the 2 upper wage categories. See
Führer, op. cit., p. 475 based on Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung, 25.4. 1926. Based on the26
the low skilled and the net effect of this policy would lower the level of
unemployment benefits which were already insufficient for the subsistence of
the unemployed
77. Unions feared the possibility of conflict among those gaining
from this policy (high skilled) and those who lost (low skilled) and the effects of
this conflict on broad working class solidarity.
Small firms shared unions critique of the wage categories, however based
on different reason. Given that their reliance on skilled workers was lower that
that of large firms, they were less concerned about the need to provide
institutional guarantees to their workforce that the investment in the skills of
their workers will not be undermined during periods of unemployment. But, if
the estimates of large firms were indeed true
78, and if the concentration of the
unemployed would be predominantly among the high skilled, then the
introduction of the Lohnklassensystem would have as its consequence an
increase in the level of unemployment benefits as well as in the level of
contributions. Small firms protested against this increase in costs
79.
The complaints and opposition of unions and small firms had only the
minor effect of delaying, but not eliminating the introduction of the system of
wage categories within the unemployment insurance bill. A system that radically
improved the position of the high skilled workers within unemployment
insurance was introduced in the unemployment insurance bill of 1927.
3. 4. The organization of the policies of control of the unemployed
The poor monitoring capability of the communes in performing the means-test,
the test of the willingness to work of the unemployed and of the disciplinary
functions of a system of unemployment assistance -- the withdrawal of
unemployment benefits -- and the ‘generosity of the communes’ distribution of
unemployment benefits
80 was a crucial reason of the dissatisfaction of
                                                                                                                                                                         
survey conducted by the Reichsarbeitsamt in 1926, employers’ estimates were more
accurate. (See below).
77 Vorwärts, 8. 5. 1926; Gewerkschaftszeitung 1925, p. 623. Protokoll der 4. Sitzung des
Ausschusses der ADGB abgehalten am 9. und 10. Juli, 1926, Berlin 1927, p. 17.
78 Führer (p. 477) quotes a very significant survey conducted by the authorities to find out the
distribution of the unemployed. Based on the survey of 27.6.1926, conducted among 1.5
million unemployed, 75.2% of them were distributed among the high-skilled, among
employees in the higher wage categories.
79 DIHT an RAM, 16. 4. 1926, Zentrales Staatsarchiv Potsdam, RAM 1137.
80 Communes had additional incentives towards generosity in the distribution of benefits, given
the fact that poor relief was entirely financed by communes, whereas unemployment
assistance was, after, 1923, in part financed by contributions. On employers complaints see
Böhm, Gustav, Bedeutet die Ersetzung der Erwerbslosenfürsorge durch die
Arbeitslosenversicherung eine Mehrbelastung der Wirtschaft?, in Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1924, p.
592 “die Gemeinden, die bei ihrem Einfluss auf den öffentlichen Arbeitsnachweis auch heute27
employers with the system of unemployment assistance and fuelled employers
complaints that the risk of unemployment is ‘uninsurable’ and ‘self-caused’.
The question of zumutbare Arbeit, of appropriate jobs that the unemployed
has to take was the first issue that required legal clarification. In their demands
for the legal clarification of this notion, employers had to balance two competing
tendencies. While the vagueness and indeterminacy of the existing definition of
zumutbare Arbeit within the system of unemployment assistance was
unacceptable to employers; a very narrow definition that neglected the skills of
their workers (by tying the acceptable job to the physical ability of the
unemployed to perform a job) could undermine the skill qualifications of their
workforce.
The different skill requirements between large and small firms led to a
disagreement over this issue. Small firms, with very low reliance on skilled
workforce required the elimination of any considerations about the qualification
of the employee in the definition of the job that unemployed had to accept. In
the meeting of the central committee of the Deutscher Industrie- und
Handelstag of 28 October 1920, small firms demanded that the physical ability
of the unemployed to perform a job should be the sole criterion of the definition
of a job that the unemployed had to accept 
81 and that all considerations of
skills should be eliminated
82.
Large firms, on the other hand supported a broader definition of the
appropriate job that was not grounded in the physical ability of the unemployed
                                                                                                                                                                         
noch tatsächlich als Vollzugsorgane der Erwerbslosenfürsorge angesprochen werden
können, haben es in langjähriger Praxis teilweise vorzüglich gelernt, die
Erwerbslosenfürsorge soweit als möglich zur Entlastung der Wohlfahrts-pflege, deren Kosten
sie ganz zu tragen haben, heranzuziehen.” On employers’ request that the distribution of
unemployment benefits should be taken away from the communes, see Heinrichsbauer, in
Arbeit und Beruf, 1925, p. 656 “Die Arbeitslosenversicherung kann nicht in der gleichen Hand
bleiben, die die gemeindliche Wohlfahrtspflege und die Gemeindearbeiten zu finanzieren hat.
Hier muss eine scharfe und klare Scheidung stattfinden".
81 “Passende Arbeit ist jede Beschäftigung, die der körperlichen Beschaffenheit des Arbeiters
zugemutet werden kann.” Zentrales Staatsarchiv Potsdam, RWM 2078, Bericht der Sitzung
Des Hauptausschusses des Deutschen Industrie und Handelstages vom 28. - 29. October
1920. This session of the DIET is particularly important, since it signals the decision of the
DIHT to cooperate in the insurance solution and the overcoming of their prior opposition to
the insurance solution.  “Trotzdem will der Hauptausschuss des Deutschen Industrie- und
Handelstages an der Gestaltung des dem Reichsrat vorliegenden Gesetzes mitarbeiten”, if
appropriate control of the unemployed is maintained.
82 See also Handel und Gewerbe, XXVIII: 6, 6. XI. 1920, p. 56. “Als passende Arbeit gilt jede
Arbeit, die dem Versicherten nach seiner körperlichen Beschaffenheit zugemutet werden
kann und zu der er fähig ist, auch wenn sie ausserhalb seines Berufes und seines
Wohnortes liegt".28
to perform a job
83, a broader understanding which was initially part of the 1920
draft of the unemployment insurance act
84. This broader definition had to be
counterbalanced, however, by the development of other policy instruments
through which unemployed were forced to accept the job that, such as the a
shortening of the time period during which unemployed could receive
unemployment benefits or the lengthening of the time period before which the
unemployed could claim unemployment insurance benefits. The issue was
resolved within the draft of the unemployment insurance bill of 1925 which
incorporated the demands of employers in large firms, requiring the
unemployed to performs only ‘jobs that are appropriate if one considers the
education and the employment history of the unemployed
85.
Employers complaint with the ability of the communes perform the means
test went hand in hand with their attempt to preserve the means test within the
insurance solution. This demand brought a convergence in the preferences of
large and small firms.
Keeping the means-tested system of unemployment benefits within a
system of unemployment insurance contradicted the basic principles of an
insurance system, since, in an insurance system, the legal claim to receive
benefits is based on past contributions and not on evidence of the need of the
unemployed. To find a solution around this legal conundrum, employers went at
great length at suggesting that in the case of unemployment insurance not the
risk of unemployment is the object of insurance, but the social need that is
caused by unemployment (die durch Arbeitslosigkeit entstandene Notlage
86) If
one accepts that not the risk of unemployment is the object of insurance, then
the consequence, according to the DIHT is that the ‘need of the unemployed’
still remains a precondition of receipt of unemployment benefits
87. Keeping the
means test within the insurance solution was viewed as a vital instrument by
both large and small firms to keep the costs of the insurance system low.
                                                          
83 Zentrales Staatsarchiv Potsdam, Reichsarbeitsamt 4310/ 470- 476, Denkschrift der
Vereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, Berlin, 24. April 1920. “Die Interpretation
des Ausdruckes passende Arbeit ist zu weitgehend".
84 Reichsgesetzblatt, 31.5. 1920; Nr. 5; See also Lewek, op. cit., p. 119.
85 Regierungsentwurf zum Arbeitlosenversicherungsgesetz von 1925, § 45, Abs. 1., die unter
billiger Berücksichtigung seiner Ausbildung und seiner bisherigen Tätigkeit zugemutet
werden kann.
86 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstages. Sitzung des Sozialpolitischen
Ausschusses, Berlin, Feburary 16, 1926, Heft 6, Berlin: 1926, p. 11. „Nicht die
Arbeitslosigkeit, aber die durch Arbeitslosigkeit entstandene Notlage ist Gegenstand der
Versicherung.“ There was some dissent to the official position of the Deutscher Industrie- und
Handelstag that the means test should be maintained within the insurance system. See
positions of Komerzienrat Weh and Soetheer, p. 10 and 11.
87 Ibid., See Official Statement of DIHT on p. 13. Die Bedürftigkeit der Anspruchserhebenden
bleibt als Voraussetzung für den Anspruch aus der Versicherung.29
This demand of employers met with opposition from both unions and legal
experts within the bureaucracy that pointed to the legal incompatibility between
the logic of an insurance system and means-testing the benefits. Unions in
particular demanded the immediate abolition of the means-tested system which
was used in a very discretionary way by the communes
88. The solution that was
ultimately reached in the unemployment insurance law was a legal compromise
between the employers’ demands, unions concerns and the state’s worries
about the financial viability of the system. The means-test was maintained only
under those circumstances when the payment of unemployment benefits
exceeded the levels of available reserves and when the state has to resort to a




The transition from the policies of unemployment assistance to a system of
unemployment insurance during the Weimar period represents a crucial
analytical case for current debates that are bringing the analysis of employers
back into political science literature
90 and for a more recent direction of
research that attempts to bring together comparative models of social policy
and comparative models of the political economy
91. The broad range of policy
alternatives that were considered during that period allows us to contrast the
political redistribution of the risk of unemployment within a multitude of
institutional arrangements and to identify the particular coalition of interests that
supported each solution. Given the substantial change in the preference of
employers about the ‘ideal’ institutional arrangement that addressed the risk of
unemployment, from a position of veto and rejection of the insurance solution to
a position of qualified support and collaboration in the process of institutional
design, it is an ideal test case for political explanations of the determinants of
employers preferences towards social policy.
This paper has started by critiquing a number of approaches that have
focused on the role played by the organized working class in the transition from
‘assistance’ to ‘insurance’ in social policy (for their specification of social policy
that lacks theoretical generality and for neglecting the role of employers) or on
preexisting policy legacies (for neglecting the political conflict among key social
                                                          
88 Gewerkschaftszeitung, 35. Jg., 1925, p. 636.
89 § 52 in III/2.
90 On this direction of research, see among others, David Soskice, 1994, National Patterns in
Company Innovation Strategies: A Comparative Institutional Advantage Approach,
manuscript.
91 On this see, Paul Pierson, 1995, op. cit.; Gosta Esping Andersen, 1994, op. cit.30
actors as an underlying mechanism through which policy legacies are
reproduced) as well as of approaches concerned with the role played by
employers in the development of the modern welfare state (for their failure to
provide an explanation for the political preference of employers towards social
policy that has theoretical microfoundations and is grounded in the self-
interested behavior of employers as well as for the failure to provide a model
that distinguished between the ‘pre-strategic’ and ‘strategic’ preferences of
employers).
The crucial theoretical concern of this paper has been the question of
employers pre-strategic  preferences towards different social policies. The
argument of the paper is that the change in the preference of employers from a
rejection of any system of compensation against the effects of unemployment
to a support of a system of contributory unemployment insurance is not simply
a change in the strategic preferences of employers (that results from the
interaction with other social actors) or of employers’ anticipation of a policy
outcome that has a high probability of being successful, but a change in the
‘real’ or ‘pre-strategic’ preference of employers, that is in turn caused by
changes in the balance of power among German employers from ‘traditional’
industries (such as iron and steel) to more skill-intensive industries that rely
more heavily on exports (chemicals, machine tools, electricals) and by
differences in the structure of the risk of unemployment faced by these
industries. The analysis of employers’ evaluation of alternative social policies
that address the risk of unemployment reveals that German employers of large
firms in skill-intensive industries exposed to competition on world markets
preferred a contributory insurance solution to the risk of unemployment in order
to create a large pool of risk that spread the risk of unemployment across all
occupations, that increased their degree of control over the conditions of re-
employment and that gave institutional guarantees to their workforce that their
skills will not be undermined during periods of unemployment.
I have argued that there are three dimensions along which one can analyze
employers preferences towards various social policies. The first is the capacity
of various social policies to redistribute risks (that vary in the way in which they
affect particular industries) across several occupational categories. The second
is the locus of control within the each policy, employers preferring those
institutions that increase their ability to exercise control. The third is the costs
imposed by alternative social policies, which in turn, is the result of a number of
factors, such as the relationship between contributions and benefits, the level of
state subsidies, the boundary of the risk pool, etc. Analyzed along these three
dimensions, one finds an intersectoral divergence in the preferences towards
social policies, both among employers of large and small firms and among
employers in export and non-export sectors.31
The analysis has not addressed the second part of the question of
employers’ preferences towards social policies which is the issue of the
strategic aspect of employers preferences
92. I have shown the surprising
convergence in the institutional preferences of employers and unions over the
organization of the risk pool that incorporated all occupations and in their
opposition to differential contributions to the insurance system that had to be
paid by occupations affected by the risk of unemployment differently. Yet this
convergence of preferences is still very far from a cross-class alliance, as there
is virtual no evidence on common deliberations between unions and employers
over the organization the risk pool within the insurance solution. A major
difference between the argument of this paper and a cross-class alliance
argument is that in cross-class alliance arguments an agreement between
unions and employers is reached on the second best preference of both actors;
in this case, however, a contributory insurance was, for employers the preferred
institutional outcome, while for unions it remained the second best outcome.
This difference raises the question whether unions were a necessary partner in
the alliance supporting the introduction of the Ghent system, once employers
signal their preference for a contributory system of unemployment insurance.
Given that on many other issues (such as the definition of the ability to work,
policies to maintain the means-test within the insurance solution, organization
of institutions that address the regional variation in the degree of
unemployment) the position of unions was defeated and did not enter the
unemployment insurance bill, the role of unions in the transition from a means-
tested to a system of unemployment insurance loses the centrality it had in the
laborist accounts of welfare state development.
                                                          
92 The empirical evidence, of course, confronts us with a mixture of pre-strategic and strategic
motifs.32
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